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STATEMENT OF ISSU55 PRESENTED FOR REVISE 
(1) Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in denying 
Appellant's pro-se motion to re-appoint counsel on appeal. 
(2) Was Appellant denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel on his direct appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In Re; State V. Humphries, case no. 880704-CA, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of Issuing Bad Checks, 
a felony in the third degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
76-6-505 (1) (Supp. 1988), citing that the issues presented for 
review v/ere not properly preserved before the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is properly before 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 (5). and Rules 
42 and 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Lotion for 
enlargement of time in which to file said Writ of Certiorari was 
filed and granted on December 14th 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Thomas R. Humphries, was convicted November 4th, 
1988, in a trial by jury of the charge Issuing Bad Checks in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-6^505 (1). Defendant subsequently 
appealed, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an 
unpublished Memorandum Decision filed November 15th, I989. Prior 
to appointed counsel's filing of a Docketing Statement, Defendant 
filed with the trial court a pro-se motion to re-appoint counsel 
on appeal, on January 19th, 1989, said motion was denied on 
January 31st, 1989. (attached hereto as Adendum "A") After 
appointed counsel filed his brief in the Utah Court of appeals 
the Befendant filed with the reviewing court a motion to re-
appoint counsel as counsel refused to address meritoriously 
arguable issues as requested. The Utah Court of Appeals denied 
said motion in an order dated July 20th, 1989 (attached hereto 
as Addendum'^"). 
To fully address the issues presented for review it is 
necessary to begin at the initial conflict occurring in the 
case at bar. For benefit of this Court it should be noted that 
all three Davis County Public defenders are also at the same time 
Prosecuting City Attorneys for various cities within Davis County 
(sent. T. 10). 
At the time set for Preliminary Hearing the trial court 
appointed Attorney Glenn T. Cella a Davis County Public Defender, 
to represent the Defendant. The Defendant at that time raised an 
issue of conflict being that Attorney Cella was also Prosecuting 
Attorney for the City of Kaysville, the City that had filed and 
investigated the charges against the Defendant. Counsel stated 
to the Court that he felt there was indeed a conflict and didn't 
fee'l 'it was appropiate for him to proceed in the case at bar 
(prelim. T.3-6). Attorney Cella at that time attempted to to turn 
his conflict to Davis County Public Defender Attorney Steve Vanderlinden 
who was at the same tine Prosecuting Attorney for the Git- or" 
(2) 
Clearfield, Attorney Vanderlinden refused to accept the appointment 
citing two reasons for his refusal; (1) that he didnft feel 
Attorney Cellafs conflict was legitimate under the scope of the 
contract with Davis County; and two (2) that he shouldn't have 
to accept the additional burden that the caseload would present 
(T.3-6 12/20/88) (T. 5 1/3/89). Attorney Cella then retained 
Attorney Cathcart to represent the Defendant at trial • The 
Defendant strenously objected to the finacial arrangements existing 
between counsel's at the time of trial (trial T. ^-5)« At the 
time set for sentencing counsel for the Defendant filed with the 
trial court the following motions; (1) Notice of Appeal; (2) 
Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause; (3) Withdrawal of Counsel, 
The trial court questioned counsel as to why he was appointed as 
opposed to Attorney Vanderlinden, Counsel responded that Attorney 
Vanderlinden had a conflict of interest with the Defendant (sent, T, 
10). 
The trial court then appointed Attorney Vanderlinden as 
appellate counsel. At the hearing held December 20thf 1989, Attorney 
Vanderlinden failed to appear before the court, instead he asked 
Attorney Cella to enter an appearance before the court to explain 
his refusal to accept said appointment on appeal, subsequently 
the trial court ordered Attorney Vanderlinden to accept said appointment 
(T.3-6 12/20/88). The trial court then continued the hearing 
ordering Attorney Vanderlinden to present himself before the court. 
At the time of the hearing the Defendant objected to Attorney 
Vanderlinden's representation without him having first review the 
trial transcripts (T«5 1/3/89)• The trial court again continued the 
hearing determining that it would be advantageous for counsel to first 
(3) 
review the trial transcripts prior to arguments being heard(T.9 
1/3/89). The Defendant subsequently filed a pro-se motion to 
dismiss and re-appoint appellate counsel and raised two issues 
one (1) that counsel having previously stated that in his opinion 
the conflict occurring was not a true conflict, he would be unable 
to effectively represent the Defendant on that issue on appeal;(2) 
that counsel was unprepared because of his excessive caseload and 
refused to raisemeritourisly arguable issues on appeal (T.4-9 1/31/89). 
(T. 4 3/1V89) (T. 19-20 3/28/89). 
The Defendant repeatedly requested counsel to raise on appeal 
the following issues; (1) the conflict occurring at trial due to 
the contractual arrangement between Attorney's Cella and Cathcart; 
(2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for his failure to 
raise an objection to the numerous errors occurring throughout the 
trial; (3) the issue of "plain error" as defined by Rule 103 (2) 
(d), Utah Rules of Evidence; (4) the cumulative affect of the errors*. 
(5) the convictions used against the Defendant in sentencing that 
were erroneous, that were properly objected to at the time of-
sentencing, these issues were addressed in letters to both counsel 
and the Court of Appeals and is additionaly supported by the trial 
court record• 
* Attorney Vanderlinden having filed a brief on behalf of the 
Appellant v/ithout addressing the meritourisly arguable issues related 
above, the Defendant at that time again requested that the court 
dismiss and re-appoint counsel on appeal, said motion was denied 
in a Utah court of Appeals order dated July 20th, 1989* The 
Defendant's conviction having been affirmed, he would now request 
that this Court grant his Writ for Certiorari, to review the issues 
of conflict of counsel and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
The Petitioner would contend that the representation he recieved on 
appeal were in violation of Article One Section Twelve of the Utah 
Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NUMBER ONE! 
Whether the Utah Court of Appeal and the trial court erred in 
denying Appellant's pro-se motion to re-appoint counsel on appeal. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to have the compulsary process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence." 
This language has been read to include the right of indigents 
to appointed counsel in felony prosecutions, Gideon V. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 355, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed 2d 799 (1963), the right to 
self-representation, Faretta V. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 
2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (197*0 and the right to effective assistance 
of counsel, McMann V. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 t 771 n. 14, 90 
S. Ct. 1441, 1449 n.14, L.Sd. 2d 763 (1970); Birt V. Montgomery, 
725 F.2d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Sixth Amendment right 
(S) 
to counsel has four components; right to have counsel, minimum 
quality of counsel, a reasonable opportunity to select and be 
represented by chosen counsel and the right to preparation period 
sufficient to assure minimum quality counsel); Gandy V, Alabama. 
569 F. 2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme 
Court in Faretta, supra, stated as follows? 
"The language and spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment contemplates that counsel, like other 
defense tools guaranteed by the amendment, shall 
be an aid to a willing defendant.*** To thrust 
counsel upon the accused, against his considered 
whish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. 
In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but 
a master? and the right to make a defense is 
stripped of personal character upon which the 
Amendment insists.*** An unwanted counsel 'represents1 
the defendant only through a teneous and unacceptable 
legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced 
in such representation, the defense presented is not 
the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, 
in a very real sense, it is not his defense.*** 
But it is one thing to hold that every defendant, 
rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of 
counsel, and quite another to say that a State may 
compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not 
want. The value of the state-appointed counsel was 
not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the notion 
of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them. 
And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the 
Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that 
they understood the inestimable worth of free choice." 
Thus, a defendant in a criminal trial, or in the case 
at bar on appeal , does not have an absolute right to counsel 
of his choice when indigent, but, when the defendant has made 
a showing that irreconcilable differences have created a conflict, 
that conflict should be fully explored by the trial court. Both 
the trial court and the reviewing court made a determination that 
they could see no violations of Constitutional rights suffered 
by the defendant, however controlling case law on the issue 
. <u - _i—,^ «y^ ah on id be presumed 
by the court, when such an issue is raised. In the case of 
vVheat V. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Gt. 1692, IOC 
L.Ed. 2d 140 (1988), the Court found that counsel should be 
replaced when "even the appearance of impropriety exists." 
The duty rests with the trial court to examine thoroughly 
the attorney-client relationship and to examine it as a very serious 
duty. In White V. White, 602 F. Supp. 173 (Mo. wd 193*0, the 
defendant requested several times that his court-appointed counsel 
be replaced. The basis of his complaint was that counsel working 
with an overburdened caseload and had, therefore, failed to 
exercise the customary skill and dilligence that a competent attorney 
would have shown under similiar circumstances. The Court was of 
the opinion that when an accused is forced to stand trial with the 
assistance of appointed counsel with whom he has become embroiled 
in conflict, the accused is denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel. The Court stated in that case as follows; 
"The trial court, when confronted by such an 
allegation, has an obligation to inquire thoroughly 
into the factual basis of the defendant's dissatisfaction. 
If an attorney and a client have an irreconcilable 
conflict, essential attributes of a healthy attorney-
client relationship are non-existent. *** 
... a careful Bxaminatoin into the nature of the 
disagreement, its duration and the impact it would 
have on the conduct of the defense should have been 
conducted Had the reasons for the conflict been 
fully explored, the air might have been cleared. On 
the other hand, the completeness of the rift between the 
two might have been established.... Under the circumstances, 
petitioner need not show that he was actually prejudiced 
by the irreconcilable conflict with his counsel. 
Freiudice should be presumed from a fractured attorney-
client relationship just as it would be if the petitioner 
had been denied the assistance of counsel.11 
(7) 
In the instant case Attorney Vanderlinden had been appointed 
by the trial court on appeal and for the purposes of post-trial 
motions before the court, at the hearing on December 20thf 1988, 
Attorney Vandelinden refusing to represent the defendant, requested 
that Attorney Cella stand in and explain the situation to the trial 
court, Attorney Cella addressed the court as follows: 
Mr, Cella: Judge we've had a discussion between Mr, Oda, Mr. 
Humphries and myself regarding the problems arising to the public 
defenders system or to our public defenders contract out of Mr, 
Humphries appeal. We've explained the problem to Mr. Humphries, 
and he has certain constitutional rights that he's not willing to 
waive, and we aren't asking him to waive any of those rightsT 
However, I had a conflict in this originally in the case. 
It was investigated by a Kaysville City police officer. Under 
the public defender system contract, my conflicts of interest are 
supposed to be assigned to Mr. Vanderlinden. Mr. Vanderlinden 
felt that the conflict generated by my prosecution for Kaysville 
City was not a true conflict under the scope of the public defender 
contract, and he declined to accept the —accept the case through 
the public defender system. 
••••• Mr. Cella: Stephan and I spent a few minutes talking with 
Judge Page about the probability of trying to get some idea of where 
the court wanted us to go on this matter. And Judge Page requested 
and said that in situations such as that and in the event that Mr. 
Vanderlinden declined to accept my conflict of interest, that that 
posistion should be made known to the Court." 
... So in any event, as I was explaining, Jud^e Page said in 
additional situations such as that, I should merely inform the 
Court and order the Court to order Mr. Vanderlinden to take the 
case. And Judge Page said that would be how to handle the matter." 
(T. 3-5 12/20/88) 
Further, four members of the bar attempted to explain 
to the trial court Attorney Vanderlinden felt that a conflict 
existed between himself and his client, (1) Attorney Cathcart, 
at sentencing (T. 10); (2) Attorney's Cella and Oda, as related 
above; (3) District Attorney Brian Namba (T. 5 1/03/89)• *he 
(8) 
trial court repeatedly refuse to accept Attorney Vanderlindenfs 
posistion on the conflict, rather the court deciding to exert 
it's influence over Attorney Vanderlinden to accept the case; 
"The Court? When did you talk to Mr. Vanderlinden last on this? 
I talked to him a week ago, and he was going to do this personally. 
Mr. Cella: That's total news to me. 
The Courts I talked with him right after we were in court two 
weeks ago. I worked with him for three or four days. And by 
Friday, a week ago, last Friday, he said I'll take the case." 
(T. 5 12/20/88) 
Who better than counsel, should determine whether a serious 
conflict exists between himself and his client and then for the 
trial court to exert improper influence over Attorney Vanderlinden 
to accept a case he did not want, was indeed an error in judicial 
discretion. 
The Petitioner would respectfully requset that this Court 
grant it's V/rit of Certiorari to review the above related circumstances 
for abuse of discretion in violation of the Defendant's right to 
the assistance of counsel. 
ISSUE NUMBER TWO! 
Was Appellant denied his right to effective assistance of counsel 
on -his direct appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals? 
When nev/ly appointed counsel attempted to argue a Motion for 
Certificate of Probable Cause, without first a review of the trial 
transcripts (T. 5-6 l/03/89)f had never heard of the "plain Error" 
doctrine, told the defendant that the issue of the trial court 
properly addressed on appeal, but, at matter for post-conviction 
relief, the defendant knew he was in trouble and subsequently 
petitioned the trial court for appointment of new counsel on appeal 
(T.4 1/31/89). The trial court denied the motion and subsequently 
Attorney Vanderlinden filed a brief on the defendant's behalf in 
the case at bar. When the Defendant learned that the brief did 
not contain the meritoriously arguable issues as requested by the 
defendant, he then petitioned the Court of Appeals to appoint new 
counsel on appeal which was denied. 
In the case of Strickland V. Washington, 80 L.Ed 2d 674 (1984), 
the U.S. Supreme Court enuniated the general rules relating to the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as follows: 
••This Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order 
to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. 
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present 
at trial along side the accused, however, it is not 
enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The 
Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance 
of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a 
role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial 
system to produce just results. 
For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the 
right to counsel is the right to effective assistance 
of counsel." Strickland at 691 and 692. 
This Court in the case of State V, McNicol, 55^ P. 2d 203 
204 "Cu'tah 1976), stated that: 
"the right of the accused to have counsel is not satisfied 
by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record 
by an attorney who manifests no real concern about 
the interests of the accused, v^e is entitled to the 
assistance of a competent member of the bar, who shows 
(U) 
a willingness to identify himself with the interests 
of the accused and present such defenses as are 
available under the law and consistent with the 
ethics of the proffession.M 
In the present case the petitioner requested repeadedly that 
counsel raise and argue certain issues on appeal as related below 
from post-sentencing transcripts as follows: 
Mr, Humphries: As the Court's well aware, on several occasions 
I brought the issue of conflict of counsel, I won't get into 
that today, your Honor. I would ask that considering the 
conflict that the Court would reserve me or allow me to argue 
after Attorney Vanderlinden is through if I feel that is necessary. 
The Court: I don't care. If you want to argue your case, it's 
all right with me, 
i'lr. Humphries: Your Honor not necessarily argue but at least 
put it on the record to reserve the issues for appeal. 
••., I just want the Court to be aware of the fact that right 
now I do not recognize Attorney Vanderlinden as counsel even though 
the court has allowed him to argue this certificate of probable 
cause, I don't feel that Attorney Vanderlinden can effectively 
represent my interest in this case. 
The Court: It seems like you have a hard time deciding if he is -
going to represent you or not, 
Mr, Humphries: No,sir. The Court has ordered me to proceed with 
Attorney Vanderlinden, 
The Court: No, I haven't. 
Mr. numphries: So much. Or procees pro-se. 
The Court: That's correct, I have said I'm not appointing you 
another attorney. 
Mr. Humphries: I told the Court, your Honor, that I'm not 
capable of representing myself. I have no choice but to go along 
.th him to some certain extent to try and help my defense, to 
•y and make it valid at least a little bit, 
,e Court: Are you through? •• (T. 5-6 3/14/89) 
*• Humphries: Your Honor, if I may nlease, I asked counsel 
> bring up these issues before. He didn't think it was proper 
; the time, but I think he has second thoughts after Attorney 
imba's arguments. 
Attorney Namba brought up the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, 
Ld we would ask the Court that it would consider the misconduct, 
Le statements of dishonesty throughout his closing arguement when 
.ewied as a whole whether they would be considered plain error and 
) go further into the ineffectiveness of counsel during the trial, 
>r counsel not to object to all these different things through the 
•ial: the voir dire, Attorney Nambafs repeated references to 
r
 dishonesty, instructions to the jury, even the association 
Lether the jury foreman recognized a witness. And Attorney Cathcart 
tiled to object, and the Court did not delve in a little bit 
irther into that relationship. So when viewed as a whole, would 
;torney Cathcartfs representation be considered ineffectivene-
distance of counsel?" 
Several times both on the record and by letters, which were 
jver answered by counsel (T. 8 3/1^/89)f the defendant asked 
Lat these issues be raised on appeal. In the case of Barnes^V Jones, 
•A. N.Y. 1981, 665 F2d 427 the Court addressed the issue of 
pointed counsels failure to raise issues as requested as follows: 
ff
 •• .where a defendants appointed counsel intends to argue 
particular colorable points, but defendant requests that 
he raise additional colorable points, counsel must argue 
the additional points to the full extent of his proffession§. 
ability, and appointed counsels judgement that defendant 
is unlikely to prevail on the merits of his non frivilous 
arguements is no substitute for an active advocates 
presentation of those arguments to the appellate court.11 
In the case at bar the defendant made every effort to explain 
bo both the trial court and the Court of appealsf that counsel 
vas refusing to raise issues as requested. In addressing the trial 
sourt the on the issue the defendant stated: 
The Court: I assume what your probably saying in the matter, 
Mr. Humphries, is that you want to be listed as co-counsel? 
Mr. Humphries: Your Honor, no, I don't think that I'm even 
capable of co-counsel, I just want to—I just want to be able to 
assert my rights before the Court. That is all, your Honor. The 
Court has made a decision that Attorney Vanderlinden is goin£* to 
represent me in this matter. I have brought the issue to the Court. 
The Court: You made the decision. 
Mr. Humphries: The issues I feel are pertinent to this are 
on the record, and I hope they're on the record for the purposes 
of appeal I filed with the Utah Court of Appeals. So, therefore, 
to protect my interests, I think I've done all I can. I leave the 
rest up to the Court, your Honor. " (T. 10-3/1V89) 
Further, the petitioner has identified omissions by counsel 
that "fall outside the wide range of proffessinally competent assistance." 
State V. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) . In the case of 
Estes V, texas, 38I U.S. 532, 5^ 3 (1965) citing in part 
Offutt V. United States, 3^ 8 U.S. 11, 14 (1955) t the Supreme 
Court stated: 
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement" 
of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence 
of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system 
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness..... To perform its high function 
in the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of 
Justice." 
Conclusion 
The petitioner would request that theCourt grant it's Writ 
of Certiorari to review the above entitled case for violations 
of defendant's rights a guaranteed by the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah. It is the Petitioners 
contention that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution combine to assure each and every defendant 
is afforded the oppourtunity to have a fair and impartial trial 
and a fair and impartial review on aoneal. 
(lift 
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T^ fl7»W% fclkunflL* 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES 
IN PROPIA PERSONA 
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ADDENDUM " A " 
MAS R. HUMPHRIES 
D. BOX
 v 2 5 0 
&PER UTAH 84020 FILED '.' 
OAVi' 
PROPIA PERSONA ^ ^
 | 9 ^ £ 3 7 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN £NDFOR .DAVIS :CDUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
OMAS R. HUMPHRIES 
DEFENDANT 
LE; J T Y CLERK 
Case No.Cr6119 
Motion to dismiss counsel 
and for appointment of 
new counsel on Appeal 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT, comes now the Defendant Thomas R. 
mphries and hereby moves the court for an order appointing new counsel 
1 appeal of the case at bar. The Defendant would also petition the court 
> dismiss previously appointed counsel. As shown by the affidavit of 
idigency peviously filed with the 1 court for the request of counsel he is 
lable to pay costs of obtaining said counsel. 
Dated this / Qf day o f t ^ ^ 1989 
Thomas R. Humphries 
IN PROPIA PERSONA 
hereby certify that I delivered 
true and correct copy of the 
aregoir.g motion on the following 
y deposit with the U.S. mail. 
Davis~pbunty D i s t r i c t Attorney 
Thomas R. Humphr 
HOMAS R. HUMPHRIES 
.0. BOX 250 
RAPER UTAH 84020 
H PROPIA PERSONA 
KS9J.VJ |8 /JH0 37 
ri r 
- i \ I 
•^."JrvcLEnx 
IN THE SECOND JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
30MAS R. HUMPHRIES 
DEFENDANT 
CASE NO. CR6119 
motion for purchase of transcripts 
at the states expense 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT, the Defendant moves the court for 
i order directing the state to pay the cost of preperation and filing of the 
ranscripts of the foiling hearings of record, Arraingmsnt, Pre trial , Trial 
id sentencing , and any other record that would properly enable the Defendant 
> present his case on appeal. 
1989 Dated this /Q day of LW"*Q/ 
Thomas R, Humphries 
IN PROPIA PERSONA 
hereby certify that I have served 
true and correct copy of the foregoing 
on the following individual, by deposit 
th the U.S. Mail. 
vis County District Attorney 
omas R. Humphries 
ADDENDUM "B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
F I L E D 
JUL 2 01989 
S t a t e of Utah, 
P l a i i t i f f and Respondent , 
v . 
Thoma s R• Humph r i e s , 
Defeidant and Appellant, 
* ORDER 
) 
) 
) Case No. 880704-CA 
) 
) 
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion To 
Appoint New Counsel On Pendency Of Appeal, filed 26 June 1989. 
Appellant is currently represented by counsel who was 
appointed by the Second Judicial District Court. Counsel 
entered an appearance herein on 3 February 1989 and, to date, 
has filed a docketing statement and brief on behalf of 
appellant. Counsel has responded timely to inquiries made by 
the Court with respect to this appeal. 
Appellant shox^ s no substantial conflict of interest T*Tith 
his attorney. As appellant was appointed competent counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion is denied. If 
appellant prefers new counsel, appellant is not precluded from 
hiring counsel of his choice. 
Dated this J20 day of July 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Jackson 
lard C. Davidson 
ding Judge 
sell W. Bench 
:iate Presiding Judge 
th M. Billings 
nal W. Garff 
lela T. Greenwood 
man H. Jackson 
gory K. Orme 
TBtafj Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
801-533-6800 
J i l l i n - ! Ml , II < J N 9 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Thomas R. Hump hi: I es 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper. UT 84020 
I r. Ke: 
State of Ut. d:\, 
PI a i nt i f f a rul Respondent, 
v. Ni 880 ; 3- 1 C A 
Thomas R. Humph r ies, 
Defendant «nd Appellant:, 
Dear Mr. Humphries: 
The Court received your letter June 15, 1989 in 
above appeal in which you contend that you have been 
ineffectively represented throughout your case. Your letter 
will be docketed as having been received. However, absent a 
motion to this Court, no action may be taken. 
Sincerely, 
Lice Hill 
Deputy Clerk 
cc: Steven C. Vanderlinden 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
ADDENDUM"C 
F i t En 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— — 0 0 O 0 0 — — 
State of Utah, 
11 din! it £ j111J Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas R. Humphries, 
•• Detendant and Appellant. 
N(#*51989 
zry T. Noonan 
•terk of tn« Court 
h Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880704-CA 
Before .Judges Qrme, Garff and Davidson, 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Issuing 
third degree felony, in violation of'Utah Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1988), We affirm the conviction. 
Ba<' Checks.. 
§ :6-6-505(l} 
On May 5, 1988/ defendant Thomas R. Humphries opened a 
checking account at the Washington Drive-up Branch of Firr^ 
Security Bank in Ogden, Utah. Defendant deposited $100 into the 
account, which was the only deposit he ever made* The bad check 
charge was based on the following six checks that were not 
honored by the bank: 
DATE WRITTEN 
May 26, 
May 27, 
May 30, 
May 30, 
June 5, 
June 5, 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1988 
PAYEE 
Bowman's Market 
Bowman's Market 
K-Mart 
Bowman*:, Ma i. k.i '1 
Ernst 
Ernst 
-AMOUNT 
$ 90.00 
$ 90.00 
$273.36 
$ 70.00 
$ 93.19 
$ 70.93 
At trial, the State introduced into evidence fifteen additional 
checks that had been returned for insufficient funds. Each of 
those checks was dated prior to the six checks described above. 
Humphries testified that he did not knowingly issue the 
bad checks. He explained that sometime between May 5 and 15, 
1988, he had given a friend, Dorie Stewart, a deposit slip and 
$3/600 in cash to be deposited in his checking account• He 
claimed that Stewart did not deposit the cash/ but applied it 
to a debt owing to her by defendant. Defendant testified that 
the money was a settlement from a fire insurance claim which 
was split between him and two business partners. He testified 
that he did not report the money taken by Stewart to the police 
because he owed her money. 
Defendant called Dorie Stewart as a witness. Prior tc 
her testimony, counsel for the State examined her on voir 
dire. Outside the presence of the jury, counsel advised 
Stewart of her rights under the Fifth Amendment against 
self-incrimination and of the penalties for theft and perjury. 
Stewart then declined to testify based on the Fifth Amendment. 
In closing argument, the State told the jury that 
Stewart "didn't want to"lie, but she also didn't want to tell 
the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest". The 
prosecutor also stated in closing that defendant is a 
"dishonest person" and to "disregard the testimony of the 
defendant because of his dishonesty." 
'. On appeal, defendant raises five claims of error. 
First, he claims it was prejudicial error for the prosecution 
to state to the jury, in closing argument, his opinion that 
defendant was a dishonest person. Second/ he contends that the 
prosecution improperly threatened a witness if she testified. 
Third, he asserts that it was prejudicial error for the 
prosecution to question defendant as to why he did not subpoena 
a witness for trial. Fourth, defendant contends it was 
prejudicial error to allow bank records into evidence that wer=: 
not a basis for the charges against defendant. Finally, 
defendant urges that it was error to allow defense counsel to 
represent defendant at the preliminary hearing where he had 
admitted he had a conflict of interest. In response, the State 
contends that defendant failed to preserve the first four 
issues for appeal and argues that the final issue is merit!ess 
because defendant expressly waived the conflict. 
We have reviewed the portions of the record pertaining 
to the assignments of error and agree that four of the issues 
have not been properly preserved for appeal. First, the record 
reflects no objection to the prosecutor's comments in closing 
argument. Absent an objection, we are precluded from reaching 
the merits of the issue on appeal. See State v. Hales, 652 
P.2d-1290, 1292 (Utah 1982), As to the second assignment of 
8 80704 CA 2 
error, the record contains no objection to the voir dire 
examination of witness Dorie Stewart. Third; although we agree 
it is inappropriate during cross examination for the 
prosecution to make any suggestion that defendant has a burden 
to establish a defense, the record also contains no objection 
to the prosecution*s questions concerning defendant's failure 
to secure corroborative testimony. The foregoing issues were 
not properly preserved in the trial court and may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant's fourth contention is somewhat more 
complicated. The charges against defendant were based upon the 
six checks previously set out in this decision. At trial, the 
prosecution examined the custodian of the records pertaining to 
defendant's checking account. The witnesses' testimony covered 
all transactions on the account during its existence. At tb° 
beginning of the testimony, defendant's counsel jnade a geneiax 
objection "to the relevancy of the bank records other than 
those records that particularly pertain to the exhibit that the 
state has entered." The trial court clarified the nature ci 
the objection with counsel by inquiring if counsel was 
objecting to the admission of "other checks other than the ones 
that we're prosecuting." Defense counsel agreed that this was 
the objection he intended to make. The court overruled the 
objection "at this time," indicating "I haven't heard anything 
objectionable, but you'll have to redo your objection if 
something comes up that is objectionable." Defense counsel 
acquiesced in this procedure. The prosecution submitted 
photocopies of fifteen checks, in addition to the six checks 
that are the basis of the charge. Defense counsel objected to 
the use of photocopies of the checks, which was resolved, but 
made no other objection to the admission of the checks. We 
conclude that the issue has not been preserved for 
consideration on appeal. 
Defendant's final claim is that the jury verdict should 
be overturned because counsel who represented defendant at the 
preliminary hearing had a conflict. We note that the 
preliminary hearing transcript was not transmitted to this 
court by the trial court as a portion of the official record. 
Instead, the first eleven pages of a document entitled 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing was submitted as an adden im 
to defendant's brief and, as such, is not a part of the 
official record before this court. We further note, however, 
thgdb.both defendant and the State have relied upon this 
addendum, and on that basis, neither may challenge its *sli-:: -y 
as an accurate depiction of the proceedings. At the time of 
the preliminary hearing, defense counsel, Glen Cella, indicator! 
880704-CA 3 
that, based on a police report he had not seen prior to th-t 
day, he determined that he had a conflict in Representing 
defendant. The report reflected that charges had been 
investigated by Kaysville City Police, and defense counsel ,.< d 
served as a prosecutor for Kaysville in the past. After 
consultation, however, defendant determined that he would waive 
the conflict for purposes of the preliminary hearing only. The 
trial court examined defendant about his waiver and ruled that 
the hearing could continue. Substitute defense counsel 
represented defendant at the trial. (At the commencement of 
the trial, defendant made a motion to disqualify substitute 
counsel, which was denied.) Defendant now renews his original 
objection to Cella's representation at the preliminary hearing, 
attacking his own waiver of the conflict on the basis that he 
should not have been put to the choice of waiving the conflict 
or waiting in jail for substitute counsel's appointment. A 
defendant generally may not premise a claim of error on a 
ruling that he himself both assented to and sought. See, e.g., 
State v. Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2" (Utah 1989) (A 
defendant may not allege on appeal prejudicial error which was 
affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived); State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987) (Invited error is 
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially 
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a 
result) . We hold that defendant has waived the apparent 
conflict of interest and may not premise error on that basis. 
,For the foregone reasons, the conviction appealed '. i om. 
is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
-*7i 4 
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE 
1 hereby oertny tnat 1 caused to be served four true and 
correct copys of th? foregoing Wri^ c* Certiorari unor. the 
Utah Attorney ^ ^ ^ ^ i by deposit postage pre-pair; *-*/l4, - •-
Mail. 
Dated this IL day of >k*H*»*^ 1990 
/ 
Thomas R. Humphries 
